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Abstract
By investigating the effect of earnings quality on corporate social disclosure (CSD) in the
context of Vietnam, this study tests whether firms uphold managerial opportunism based on
the agency theory or social responsibility based on stakeholder theory. It also tests the
moderating effect of state and foreign ownership on the relationship between earnings quality
and CSD. This study finds that the long-term perspective argument dominates in the
relationship between earnings quality and CSD, indicating that earnings quality is positively
and significantly associated with CSD. The study also finds that the increasing proportion of
shares held by the government in firms weakens the relationship between earnings quality
and CSD.

Keywords: earnings quality, corporate social disclosure, agency theory, stakeholder theory
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Introduction
The debate about managers behaviour whether self-centered or altruistic has re-surfaced with
the broadened disclosure that comprise financial and non-financial with non-financial taking
a large volume in annual reports and company websites. The debate has taken a center stage
with non-financial disclosure such as corporate social disclosure (CSD) because they are
voluntary and often not subjected to a formal audit. For instance, Prior, Surroca, and Tribo
(2008) reported that multinational firms across 26 countries used CSD to diverge attention
from earnings management. Choi, Lee, and Park (2013) subsequently found in the context of
Korea that ownership structure can influence managerial motivation to engage in CSD. The
accelerated economic growth in Vietnam, not only makes a loud appeal for foreign capital
but has taken into a period of transitional flux from state ownership to private ownership of
enterprises, with a mix of partially state-owned and partially foreign-owned enterprises. The
economic welfare of the Vietnamese society depends not only on the public funding but also
private activities and taking responsibility for the society (Vorobyeva and Phuong, 2017).
These findings from the literature bring forth examining the relationship between CSD and
earnings quality not only to contribute to the public policy in Vietnam but also to contribute
to a broader understanding as a few studies have examined the influence of earnings quality
on CSD Yip, Staden, and Cahan 2011, Chih, Shen, and Kang 2008, Kim, Park, and Wier
2012.
The managerial motivation behind CSD has come under much debate but the managerial
motivation in the context of earnings quality on CSD has received little attention. Certain
managerial motivations are identifiable through actions taken by them, certain other
managerial motivations are implicit in actions and become noticeable through outcomes. In
this study, we take the position that the firm ownership (to the extent of state ownership, or
foreign ownership) as an implicit motivation for managers to take a perspective on CSD.
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Managers can take a short-term opportunistic perspective or a long-term efficiency
perspective on CSD. When firms report earnings that are sustainable, predictable, and less
manipulated by accruals, it is indicative that firms’ earnings are reported responsibly and
predictably. It is likely that firms can take a long-term efficiency perspective on CSD.
However, in an emerging nation such as Vietnam, there is also a possibility that managers
behave opportunistically to benefit from the expansive economic growth.
Our empirical results and contributions resulting from those findings are as follows. First,
the standardised aggregate earnings quality is positively correlated with CSD when all firms
are considered. The finding contributes to the understanding that managers can take an
efficient perspective in non-financial disclosure, along with the established notion that
managers take an opportunistic view on financial disclosure. The divided managerial
perspective between financial and non-financial disclosure can inform owners and
policymakers about divergent frameworks and accountabilities required for the two strands of
disclosure.

Second, this relationship becomes weaker with the state having increasing

ownership in firms, which suggests that when the earnings quality becomes low in a stateowned company, the state-owned company is likely to decrease the stakeholder-relevant
CSD. The finding informs the statutory policymakers to closely monitor the nature and the
magnitude of state influence on managers efficiency perspective and may consider including
CSD and their activities as part of audit to uphold public policy performance matrix on
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. Third, our evidence shows that foreign ownership has
no moderating effect on the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. The finding
contributes to the public policy framework to hold foreign ownership in Vietnam become
responsible not only to contribute through taxes but also through socially beneficial activities
to Vietnam and requiring such disclosure in annual reports. Fourth, the three-dimensional
CSD index developed in this study contributes to a methodological improvement in
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measuring stakeholder-relevant CSD, making findings and facilitate stakeholder-relevant
policy revisions.

Related literature and hypotheses
Agency theory is based on the premise that there is an inherent conflict between the interests
of a firm’s owners (shareholders) and its management (Fama and Jensen 1983). Therefore,
firms may use different methods, such as compensation plans or voluntary disclosures, to
reduce conflicting interests between managers and shareholders. Accounting information is
made by agents to communicate financial position, performance, and change in financial
position to principals. Any information asymmetry between the mangers and shareholders
can lead to the moral hazard problem. Agency theory on corporate social responsibility/CSD,
argues that managers can opportunistically use corporate resources to pursue goals that
enhance their own utility in ways that are unlikely to provide significant returns to
shareholders. For example, Vanhamme and Grobben (2009) find that firms using corporate
social responsibility in times of crisis can uphold reputation only when they have a history of
corporate social responsibility disclosure. Accordingly, Friedman (1970) argues that
companies that take part in corporate social responsibility practices only want to benefit from
the reputation and the publicity they receive, with the sole objective of maximizing their own
profits. Because managerial decisions directly impact all the stakeholder groups, managers
can be viewed as not only the agents of shareholders but also the agents of other stakeholders
(Jones 1995). Consistent with these arguments, studies indicate that companies resort to
corporate social responsibility in order to hide their manipulating reported earnings (Prior,
Surroca, and Tribó 2008, Chih, Shen, and Kang 2008, Petrovits 2006). To test this view, this
study proposes the following hypothesis which is based on managers’ opportunistic
incentives:
H1A: There is a negative relationship between CSD and earnings quality.
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Based on the stakeholder theory (Freeman 1984), some researchers suggest that corporate
social responsibility is part of a long-run perspective of economic gain that may not be
financially measurable but may provide a valuable asset for future profitability, and
eventually enhances the financial status of firms (Carroll 1999, Davis 1960, Choi, Lee, and
Park 2013). Davis (1960) suggests that taking care of social responsibilities and financial
status is a necessary activity for firms, for long-run sustainability. Accordingly, Choi et al.
(2013) propose that a firm’s quality of earnings needs to be commensurate with its corporate
social responsibility activities to meet the needs of the stakeholders. Studies also indicate that
firms’ engagement with corporate social responsibility mitigates earnings management
(Scholtens and Kang 2013, Kim, Park, and Wier 2012). Based on this long-run perspective,
the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1B: There is a positive relationship between CSD and earnings quality.
Vietnamese listed firms have high state ownership and control as their institutional
environment. This is partly attributed to the fact that most of these now listed firms were
previously SOEs. The average level of state ownership of listed firms in this study is 27 per
cent. State ownership in firms assists the government to enact social objectives through firms,
and this study considers the impact of ownership structure on the CSD practices–earnings
quality relationship.
State managers have less pressure to manipulate firms’ earnings because their financial
incentive structure is not connected with firms’ earnings (Wang and Yung, 2011). The
government’s requirement is to obtain a guaranteed return from firms with state ownership.
The government is also prepared to provide additional funds to those firms (Ding, Zhang, and
Zhang 2007, Jiang and Habib 2009, Wang and Yung 2011). As a result, firms with higher
state ownership have fewer incentives to disclose more information because increasing state
ownership in firms provides greater access to firms’ information on (state) demand (Jiang and
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Habib 2009). Another reason is that firms with higher state ownership are discouraged from
disclosing more information because of political constraints (Ghazali and Weetman 2006).
There should, therefore, be a negative interaction between state ownership and earnings
quality in determining a firm’s CSD practices.
H2: More state ownership will weaken the relationship between earnings quality and CSD.
Firms with higher foreign ownership are required to increase informative disclosures in
order to raise and retain foreign investment (Boubakri et al. 2007, Haniffa and Cooke 2005).
Strengthening the supply of capital from foreign investors is crucial in the development of
many emerging capital markets (Bokpin and Isshaq 2009, Mangena and Tauringana 2007).
Firms with higher foreign ownership are considered to be associated with better monitoring
and are thus expected to reduce the ability of insiders to manipulate earnings for private
purposes (Doidge 2004, Hail and Leuz 2009). Foreign ownership also has a positive and
significant relation with the level of information transparency and in the long term can
stimulate the growth of a firm, capital markets, and a country as a whole (Ho, Tower, and
Taylor 2013).
In the Vietnamese context, the government has taken various steps to increase foreign
ownership by reducing restrictions on foreign investment. The foreign ownership maximum
limitation was increased from 20 per cent in 2000 to 30 per cent in 2003 and finally to 49 per
cent in 2005 for listed firms except for banks. The majority of foreign owners are from
developed countries that have stronger financial regulatory systems. These foreign investors
are more likely to be aware of the importance of financial and non-financial information in
investment decision making. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: More foreign ownership will strengthen the relation between earnings quality and CSD.

Measures and the sample
Earnings quality measures
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This study constructed an standardised aggregate earnings quality score based on four
accounting measures of earnings attributes used in prior studies (Francis et al. 2004,
Boonlert-U-Thai, Meek, and Nabar 2006), namely, accruals quality, earnings persistence,
earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness. Using the autoregressive approach, this
study uses these four earnings quality measures as specific to firms and each quality measure
is estimated by rolling over the specific measure over a five-year period. Because the accruals
quality measure requires lagged and forward data, a firm is included in the year t sample if
data are available for seven years from years t-5 to t+1.
Accruals quality
Accruals quality (AQ) in this study is based on the widely used Dechow and Dichev (2002)
statistical calculation technique, where it is measured by relating total current accruals to cash
flows from operations. The extent to which current accruals map to cash flows from
operations indicates higher earnings quality. Therefore, lower standard deviation of residuals
represents higher earnings quality. AQ as the standard deviation of residuals (εj) is obtained
from the following regression:
TCAj,t = φ0 + φ1CFOj,t-1 + φ2CFOj,t + φ3CFOj,t+1 + εj,t

(1)

Where TCAj,t = firm j’s total current accruals in year t (ΔCAj,t - ΔCLj,t – ΔCashj,t +
ΔSTDEBTj,t); CFOj,t = firm j’s cash flow from operations in year t; ΔCAj,t = firm j’s change
in current assets between year t-1 and year t; ΔCLj,t = firm j’s change in current liabilities
between year t-1 and year t; ΔCashj,t = firm j’s change in cash between year t-1 and year t;
and ΔSTDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in debt in current liabilities between year t-1 and year t.
All variables in equation (1) are deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1.
Earnings persistence
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Earnings persistence (PERSIS) is the extent to which current period earnings reflect future
period earnings. Following Francis et al. (2004), PERSIS is measured as the negative of the
slope coefficient estimate, ϕ1,j, from the following model:
Earnj,t = ϕ0,j + ϕ1,jEarnj,t-1 + ѵj,t

(2)

Where Earnj,t = firm’s j net income before extraordinary items in year t. All variables in
equation (2) are deflated by firm j’s total assets in year t-1. Larger values (i.e., less negative)
of PERSIS indicate less earnings quality.
Earnings predictability
Earnings predictability (PREDICT) is the ability of earnings to predict itself (Lipe 1990). Our
measure of PREDICT is the standard deviation of the residuals (ѵj) from equation (2),
following Francis et al. (2004). Larger values of PREDICT imply less earnings quality.
Earnings smoothness
This study adopts the measure of earnings smoothness (SMOOTH) in Francis et al. (2004) as
the ratio of firm i’s standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items scaled by
beginning total assets, to its standard deviation of cash flows from operations scaled by
beginning total assets. Larger values of SMOOTH imply less earnings quality.
The standardised aggregate earnings quality score
Based on the four individual earnings quality measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT,
SMOOTH), this study constructs a standardized aggregate earnings quality score. Based on
how the individual earnings attributes are ascertained, the larger the value of the individual
earnings quality measure, the lower the earnings quality. Following Leuz, Nanda, and
Wysocki (2003), the four individual earnings quality values are arranged in descending order,
so that a higher ranked value now represents higher earnings quality. The standardized
aggregate earnings quality score of a firm is computed by averaging the firm rankings for the
four individual earnings quality measures.
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CSD measures
This study constructs a three-dimensional CSD index where one dimension is the quantity of
CSD, and other two relate to disclosure type quality and disclosure item quality. A content
analysis of annual reports is used to measure the quantity of CSD. To ensure consistency,
only one of the authors coded all the annual reports, and a set of basic coding rules was
constructed to ensure reliability and validity. This was repeated after two weeks (Haji 2013)
in order to avoid the possibility that the first and the second scoring might influence each
other (Weetman and Ghazali 2006). As a second step to establish inter-rater reliability,
another author coded ten randomly selected annual reports and found no significant
difference between the two coders.
This study uses the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 3.1 index, the social indicators in
particular, to measure CSD practices in Vietnam. The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index
identify key performance aspects surrounding labor practices, human rights, society, and
product responsibility. They consist of four aspects, including 15 items of labor practices and
decent work indicators (LA1 to LA15), 11 items of human rights indicators (HR1 to HR11),
10 society indicators (SO1 to SO10), and 9 product responsibility indicators (PR1 to PR9).
The GRI framework items are used for CSD in this study because those reporting items have
been standardized across the firms and objectives, regardless of their geographical location
(Adams 2002).
Measuring disclosure quantity
In order to measure the disclosure quantity, this study examines the different items in the
checklist using binary scores. This is consistent with CSD studies in emerging capital markets
(Khan, Muttakin, and Siddiqui 2013, Haji 2013, Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The disclosure of
an item within the checklist in the annual reports is scored as ”1”, while the non-disclosure of
an item within the checklist in the annual reports is scored as ”0”.
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Measuring disclosure item quality and disclosure type quality
The binary approach to measuring disclosure quantity has been criticized because it assumes
that all items are equally important (Barako, Hancock, and Izan 2006). Lu and Abeysekera
(2014) create a combined disclosure quality measure using the importance of reporting items
and the importance of different disclosure types. This study extends Lu and Abeysekera’s
(2014) study by obtaining perceptions from 652 stakeholders about the importance of
reporting items, rather than the 12 stakeholders used in that study.
The two aspects of disclosure quality (i.e., disclosure type quality and disclosure item
quality) in this CSD index are measured by surveying four stakeholder groups (employees,
lawyers and regulators, local communities, and customers) to obtain their perceptions on
disclosure type preference (i.e., narrative; monetary quantification; numerical quantification;
both monetary and numerical), and about disclosure reporting items (i.e., items in the social
indicators of the Global Reporting Initiative 3.1). The types of disclosure are narrative,
monetary quantification (i.e. the amount of money), numerical quantification (i.e. the number
or statistics), both monetary and numerical. The social indicators in the GRI 3.1 index consist
of four aspects: labour practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. For the
type of items, if the same item is disclosed more than once with different types, an average
score is computed to allow each item to contribute to the overall results.
The questionnaires were delivered by hand to the target stakeholder groups.1 Different
stakeholder groups received different versions of the questionnaire. The social stakeholders
included employees (labor stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for aspects of
labor practices and decent work; customers (product stakeholders) who responded to the
questionnaire for product responsibility aspects; members of local communities (society
stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for societal aspects; and lawyers and
1

Given the limited number of pages allowed in the manuscript, the questionnaires are available upon request
(See the Supplementary Material, available online).
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regulators (human rights stakeholders) who responded to the questionnaire for human rights
aspects. The questionnaire has a scale of zero (unimportant) to 10 (the most important),
making it an 11-point scale. This increases the variance of responses obtained and makes the
results more reliable (Dawes 2002, Hartley and Betts 2010). The stakeholder-specific groups
were requested to rate each item from zero to 10 based on their perceptions of how important
the item was to them and how the items should be disclosed. They were also asked for their
perceptions on the importance of four disclosure types (i.e., narrative, monetary
quantification, numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) for each item based
on a rating scale from zero to 10.
The weight for a particular item is calculated by summing the integer values assigned to
the item and then dividing the total by the number of individuals who responded to the item.
Similarly, the level of importance for each type (i.e., narrative, monetary quantification,
numerical quantification, both monetary and numerical) of a particular item is calculated by
summing the integer values assigned to each particular type of disclosure for each item and
then dividing the total by the number of individuals who responded to this type. A mean
score is used to summarize the response scores within a specific stakeholder group.
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index is computed for each firm using the
following equation:
n

CSD _ INDEX j 

 Quantity * ItemQuality * TypeQuality
i 1

i

i

max( SCOREi )

i

(3)

where CSD_INDEXj = a stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional index of firm j; Quantityi =
the disclosure or non-disclosure of an item i with regard to this item’s disclosure type in firm
j; ItemQualityi = the weight of the item i disclosed; TypeQualityi = the weight for the type
(i.e., narrative, monetary quantification, numerical quantification, or both monetary and
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numerical) of the item i disclosed; n = the number of items in the checklist; and
max(SCORE) = the maximum score of three disclosure dimensions for a given firm:
disclosure quantity score * disclosure type quality score *disclosure item quality score.
Control variables
This study controls for firm characteristics such as return on assets (ROA), auditors
(AUDIT), state ownership (STATE), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and stock exchange
location (STOCK_EX), which influence CSD (e.g., Purushothaman et al. 2000, Cormier,
Ledoux, and Magnan 2011, Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a, Vu 2012).
Prior studies show that female directors are active in contributing to social issues, and are
more likely to sponsor charities and have stronger relationships with surrounding
communities, shareholders, and other stakeholder groups (Siciliano 1996, Williams 2003,
Bernardi and Threadgill 2010). Furthermore, recent literature shows that female directors are
associated with higher earnings quality (Gul, Hutchinson, and Lai 2013, Srinidhi, Gul, and
Tsui 2011). Hence, this study also uses female directors (FEMALE) as a control variable in
examining the relationship between earnings quality and CSD.
The relationship between earnings quality and CSD
The hypotheses 1A and 1B regarding the effect of CSD on earnings quality are tested using
an OLS estimator. The regression function is:

CSD _ INDEXi   0  1EQi   j ,i control var iablesi   i

(4)

In order to test the hypotheses 2 and 3 about the effects of state and foreign ownership on
CSD-earnings quality relation, the following regression is used:
C S D _ IN D E X i   0   1E Q i   2 E Q i x S T A T E
   j ,i c o n t r o l v a r i a b l e s i   i

i

  3E Q i x F O R E IG N

i

(5)

where CSD_INDEXi = firm i’s stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index; EQi =
firm i’s standardised aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the average rank across
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the four individual measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability,
and earnings smoothness); and i = 1, …, 133 firms.
The sample
The sample consists of all Vietnamese listed firms for which the required data items are
available, except for banks and other financial industry firms. This study examines the annual
reports during the year ended 31 December 2010 to capture the quality of CSD of
Vietnamese listed firms. The 2010 year was chosen in this study as on 15 January 2010, the
Ministry of Finance in Vietnam issued the Guidance for Information Disclosure on Stock
Exchange with the aim of providing guidance to enhance the disclosure practices of
Vietnamese listed firms. The individual earnings quality attributes are estimated by using
five-year rolling windows from 2006 to 2010 to generate the 2010 earnings quality measures
of the sample, similar to Francis et al. (2008). Accruals quality is one of four earnings quality
measures in this study. Because estimating this measure requires lagged and forward data,
this study generated the 2010 accruals quality measure by using the financial statement data
items for seven years, from 2005 to 2011.
The financial statement data items are extracted from the websites for Ho Chi Minh stock
exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi stock exchange (HNX) for the fiscal years 2005 to 2011. The
year 2005 is when HNX came into operation. The final sample, with all required data
available, includes 133 firms.

The results
Descriptive statistics
Table 1, Panel A, shows the ratings awarded by the employees to the various reporting items
concerning the labor aspect (LA). The highest mean score for those reporting items was 7.47
and the lowest was 6.44, out of a maximum possible score of 10. In analyzing the disclosure
types for the 15 reporting items of the labor aspect, employee respondents rated the highest
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scores for items with numerical disclosures (60% or 9 items), and for reporting items with
both monetary and numerical disclosures (40% or 6 items). Employees assigned the lowest
scores for the items with monetary disclosures (73.33% or 11 items), and for the items with
narrative disclosures (26.67% or 4 items).
Table 1, Panel B, provides the ratings awarded by lawyers and regulators to the various
information items about the human rights aspect (HR). The highest mean score for the
information items was 8.19 and the lowest was 6.38. Related to the disclosure types, out of 11
items in the human rights aspect, lawyers and regulators assigned the highest scores for items
with numerical disclosures (81.82% or 9 items), and for items with both monetary and
numerical disclosures (18.18% or 2 items). They assigned the lowest scores for items with
narrative disclosures (90.91% or 10 items) and items with monetary disclosures (9.09% or 1
item).
Table 1, Panel C, presents the ratings assigned by the members of local communities for
the various reporting items having to do with the societal aspect (SO). The highest mean
score for the reporting items was 7.92 and the lowest was 6.22. Related to the disclosure
types, interestingly, out of 10 items in the societal aspect, local communities assigned the
highest scores for all 10 items with both monetary and numerical disclosures. They assigned
the lowest mean scores to all 10 items with narrative disclosures.
Table 1, Panel D, shows the ratings awarded by customers for the various reporting items
about the product aspect (PR). The highest mean score for the reporting items was 8.08 and
the lowest was 6.62. Related to the disclosure types, out of 9 items in the product aspect,
customers assigned the highest scores for the items with both monetary and numerical
disclosures (88.89% or 8 items), and one item with narrative disclosures (11.11%). They
assigned the lowest scores to the items with narrative disclosures (55.56% or 5 items),
monetary disclosures (33.33% or 3 items), and one item with numerical disclosures (11.11%).
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< Insert Table 1 about here>
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. As shown in Table 2, the sample mean value of
EQ is 67.0. A higher EQ implies a higher level of earnings quality. The AQ measure has a
mean value of 0.06. PERSIS, which captures (the negative of) the extent to which an earnings
innovation remains in the series, has a mean value of -0.44. PREDICT has a mean value of
0.07. Finally, SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income relative to the variability
of cash flows, has a mean value of 0.48.
The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index (CSD_INDEX) ranged from 3 per
cent to 23 per cent with a mean of 10 per cent, which reveals that CSD of listed firms in the
sample is low. This is because CSD practices are relatively new in Vietnam (Vu, Tower, and
Scully 2011a). The findings are consistent with the study by Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a),
which examines the quantity of voluntary disclosure, including social disclosure, in Vietnam.
Four different social aspects of disclosure,

i.e.,

labor

(LAD_INDEX),

society

(SOD_INDEX), product (PRD_INDEX), and human rights (HRD_INDEX), have mean
scores of 17 per cent, 4 per cent, 16 per cent, and 1 per cent, respectively2.
The average percentage of state ownership in our sample is 27 per cent (with a range of
zero to 79.07 per cent), and this represents a highly concentrated ownership by the state.
Because of the 49 per cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling in Vietnamese listed firms,
the average percentage of foreign ownership is quite low (12 per cent with a range of zero to
49 per cent). The average of FEMALE is approximately 14 per cent and there are no allfemale boards.
< Insert Table 2 about here>

2

The stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional labour aspect disclosure index (LAD_INDEX) is computed for each
firm using the equation similar to the equation of calculating the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD
index but measures only with labour aspect. This is similar to measure SOD_INDEX, PRD_INDEX and
HRD_INDEX.
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Four individual earnings attribute measures (AQ, PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH) are
highly correlated, with coefficients of more than 0.3 (results are not tabulated but are
available upon request), suggesting reasonable factorability (Hair 1998). Additionally, the
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy is 0.76 for the overall test and more than
0.7 for each earnings attribute measure (not tabulated), above the commonly recommended
value of greater than 0.5 (Hair 1998). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is significant (χ2 (6) =
235.82, p < 0.000). Adopting the ‘eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule’ (Hair 1998), this study
reduces the number of factors to one because there is only one factor with eigenvalue of 2.68
(not tabulated). Factor analysis suggests that a single factor represents these four earnings
attribute measures, and they accounted for 66.90 per cent of the total variance, above the
criterion of 60 per cent (Hair 1998). Hence, it is proper to combine the four earnings
attributes measures into a single standardized aggregate measure of earnings quality. This
approach is similar to Leuz et al. (2003), who used factor analysis to clarify the combination
of four individual earnings management measures into a standardized aggregate earnings
management score.
Regression analyses and findings
This study checked for the variance inflation factor (VIF) for the regression models. Because
the individual values of VIF are less than 10 for all the regression models, multicollinearity
does not seem to be a problem for the test models in this study (Gujarati and Porter 2009).
To confirm whether or not heteroscedasticity exists, this study used the Breush-Pagan
test. The p-values were found to be significant (p < 0.04), thus the null hypothesis is rejected,
indicating the presence of heteroscedasticity. To correct the possible influence of
heteroscedasticity, OLS regression with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors (White
1980) was used to test the effect of earnings quality (EQ) on CSD (CSD_INDEX), and the
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moderating effect of the ownership structure (i.e., EQ*FOREIGN and EQ*STATE) on the
relationship between earnings quality and CSD.
Table 3 provides the results for the tests of hypotheses 1A, 1B, 2, and 3, using
CSD_INDEX as the dependent variable. The independent variables were EQ,
EQ*FOREIGN, and EQ*STATE. Two models examined the relationship between the
dependent variable and independent variables and the results are reported in Table 3.
Column (1) of Table 3 examines the relationship without interacting variables in equation
(4). In that model, the coefficient estimate of the standardized aggregate earnings quality
(EQ) is positive and significant (α1 = 0.0003, p = 0.079). This indicates that firms that report
high quality earnings also have high CSD. This result confirms hypothesis 1B (i.e., there is a
positive relationship between earnings quality and CSD).
Column (2) of Table 3 adds the interaction variables between STATE and EQ and
between FOREIGN and EQ in the model (equation (5)). They are included to reveal the
effects of state and foreign ownership on the relationship between earnings quality and CSD.
The coefficient of EQ is still positive and significant (α1 = 0.0008, p = 0.007), while the
coefficient of the interaction variable between STATE and EQ is negative and significant (0.0015, p-value of 0.034) as shown in Column (2) of Table 3, which confirms hypothesis 2
(i.e., more state ownership will weaken the relationship between earnings quality and
stakeholder-relevant CSD) suggesting that firms with more state ownership and with high
earnings quality, are likely to report less stakeholder-relevant CSD. After adding the
interaction variable of STATE and EQ, the results show that it is likely that EQ, and STATE,
have substitutive effect on stakeholder-relevant CSD. When the earnings quality becomes
low in a state-owned company, the state-owned company is likely to decrease the
stakeholder-relevant CSD. Additionally, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of
FOREIGN and EQ is negative (-0.0012) but insignificant (p value = 0.295), suggesting that

Page 18 of 34

foreign ownership does not have an effect on the relationship between earnings quality and
CSD, which rejects hypothesis 3 (i.e., more foreign ownership strengthens the relation
between earnings quality and CSD). This result is consistent with the study conducted by
Choi et. al. (2013) in Korea, which documents that the presence of foreign investors does not
influence the relationship between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility
ratings. There are two possible reasons for this. First, it could be that foreign investors may
experience difficulties in controlling managerial behavior because of the geographical
differences, language, and culture (Xiao and Yuan 2007, Choi, Lee, and Park 2013). Second,
the 49 per cent maximum foreign ownership ceiling also can limit the power of foreign
investors to influence the reporting behavior of the firm (Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a).
< Insert Table 3 about here>
The results for control variables shown in Table 3 indicate a significant positive
association (p values < 0.003) between AUDIT and CSD_INDEX, which suggests that the
quality of CSD is higher for firms that are audited by the big four audit firms, consistent with
prior studies (Craswell 1992, Inchausti 1997, Uwuigbe and Egbide 2012). Return on asset
(ROA) has positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that firms with better financial
performance are likely to make more CSD, as is consistent with the existing literature (Khan
et al., 2013; Lu and Abeysekera, 2014; Haniffa and Cooke 2005). The STOCK_EX is
positively and significantly (p values < 0.0001) correlated with CSD_INDEX, which indicates
that firms listed on HOSE are likely to engage in significantly more CSD than firms listed on
HNX. This is consistent with Vu (2012), who examined determinants of voluntary disclosure
for Vietnamese listed firms. FOREIGN is not significantly related to CSD_INDEX in column
(1), which is consistent with prior studies (Said, Hj Zainuddin, and Haron 2009, Haniffa and
Cooke 2005). In the context of this study, this is probably because the 49 per cent maximum
foreign ownership ceiling limits the power of foreign investors to influence the reporting
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behavior of the firm (Vu, Tower, and Scully 2011a). Similarly, STATE is not significantly
related to CSD_INDEX in column (1), consistent with the findings of Naser et al. (2006) and
Lu and Abeysekera (2014). This may reflect the business models in a country like Vietnam
where shares of most listed firms are owned by the government. If the government owns
shares in most firms listed on the stock exchange, these firms will have little incentive to
make voluntarily disclosures, including CSD. In column (2) of Table 3, although FOREIGN
is not significantly related to CSD, STATE is positively and moderately significant (p value =
0.063) with CSD_INDEX. FEMALE is positively significant (p values = 0.01) with
CSD_INDEX. This is consistent with prior studies (Zhang, Zhu, and Ding 2013, Post,
Rahman, and Rubow 2011).

Additional analysis and robustness tests
The standardized aggregate earnings quality score without accruals quality
Wysocki (2006) expresses concerns about using accruals quality (AQ) as an attribute to
measure earnings quality because this attribute can drive results of earnings quality,
subjugating other attributes. More specifically, Wysocki finds that current cash flows are
simultaneously significantly and negatively related to current accruals. Wysocki notes that
although there are other dimensions in a composite earnings quality measure, the accruals
quality is the most discerning and damaging dimension. Guided by Wysocki, to ensure that
results in this study are not simply driven by AQ, all tests are repeated with an alternative
earnings quality by averaging the firm rankings for the three standardized aggregated
individual earnings attributes measures (EQ_3ATTRI: earnings persistence, earnings
predictability, and earnings smoothness) only. The results are presented in Table 4.
< Insert Table 4 about here>
The results as shown in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3 and hence support
hypothesis 1B (i.e., there is a positive relationship between CSD and earnings quality),
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confirming hypothesis 2 (i.e., more state ownership will weaken the relationship between
earnings quality and CSD), but rejecting hypothesis 3 (i.e., more foreign ownership
strengthens the relation between earnings quality and CSD). The exception is that the effect
of STATE on CSD_INDEX in column (2) of Table 4 is not statistically significant, with a pvalue of 0.13. Additionally, the impact of earnings quality on CSD in column (1) of Table 4
is more significant than that of Table 3 (p = 0.037 vs. p = 0.079) whereas the interaction term
of state ownership and earnings quality in Table 4 is less significant than that in Table 3 (p =
0.077 vs. p = 0.034). Overall, these results show that findings in this study are not simply
driven by accruals quality and are generally consistent when using alternative proxies for
earnings quality.
Earnings quality and labor and society aspects of disclosure quality
Pham (2011) documents that managers of Vietnamese firms focus greatly on charity and
employment matters, such as health and safety and the working environment, in corporate
social policies. Choi et al. (2013) also state that these two aspects, society and labor, help to
counter adverse public opinions and ease strain firms have with the government and labor
unions. Following Choi et al. (2013), this study constructed another social disclosure index
consisting of two aspects, i.e., society (10 items) and labor (15 items) only, rather than the
four aspects (i.e., society, labor, human rights, and product responsibility) included in the
main model. The results are provided in Table 5. They are consistent with the main findings
in Table 3.
< Insert Table 5 about here>
Endogeneity

The main results provide evidence of a positive relationship between earnings quality and
CSD. One concern here is that the relationship may be endogenous, potentially biasing the
results. Because the sample size in this study is quite small (133 firms), to address the
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endogeneity issue, this study estimates CSD_INDEX and EQ regressions using the limitedinformation maximum likelihood (LIML) method.3
We use the length of the operating cycle (LOG.OC), measured as the log of the sum of
the firm’s days accounts receivable and days inventory, and the incidence of net loss
realizations (LOSS), computed as the number of years where the firm reported a loss as
instruments for EQ in both models in equations (4) and (5) in order to test for reverse
causality—that is, CSD influences earnings quality. The study assumes that these innate
variables do not affect CSD (at least directly) but do affect EQ. Francis et al. (2005) also
found that these two variables as innate factors of a firm influence earnings quality.
The LIML generates instrumental variables, and then tests whether those instrumental
variables are weakly correlated with the suspected endogenous variable, earnings quality.
Instrumental variables help to establish the causal effect. The null hypothesis in the LIML is
that a weak correlation between the instrumental variables (instruments) and the earnings
quality (suspected endogenous variable) indicates that earnings quality is endogenous.
< Insert Table 6 about here>
As shown in Panel A of Table 6 related to the model examining the relationship without
interacting variables in equation (4), the F statistic is 10.74, which is above the often-used
threshold of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). This indicates that this model contains one
endogenous regressor (Staiger and Stock 1997). Additionally, Stock and Yogo (2005) show
that a set of instruments is weak if a Wald test at the 5% level can have an actual rejection
rate of no more than 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25%. Therefore, Panel A of Table 6 shows that here
it can reject the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak, since the F statistic of 10.74 >
8.68 (the critical value for a rejection rate of at most 10%). On the basis of this test, the model

3

We obtain consistent results using two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation (See Table S1, available online).
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in equation (4) of this study does not have a weak-instrument problem. Earnings quality in
the OLS model is an independent and also an exogenous variable.
In contrast, Panel B of Table 6 shows that the model in equation (5) of this study has a
weak-instrument problem. The F statistic is 6.17, which is below the threshold of 10 (Staiger
and Stock 1997). In addition, the F statistic of 6.17 < 8.68 (the critical value for a rejection
rate of at most 10%), which cannot reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. Therefore,
this study relies on the OLS results for the model in equation (5).
To verify the validity of the instruments in the model in equation (4), this study does a
test for over-identifying restrictions. The results show that the p-values of Anderson-Rubin’s
statistic and Basmann’s statistic are 0.797 and 0.804, respectively. This indicates that
instruments in this model are not correlated with the error of the main regression. Therefore
the LIML estimators are superior to the OLS estimators in the model in equation (4).
This study uses the same set of control variables as in Table 3 for CSD in the LIML
regression. The results reported in Table 7, using the superior LIML estimators for the model
examining the relationship without interacting variables in equation (4), support the primary
finding in this study that earnings quality positively impacts CSD.
< Insert Table 7 about here>

Conclusions
The paper explores the relationship between CSD and earnings quality of Vietnamese listed
firms and also examines the effects of state and foreign ownership on the relationship
between CSD and earnings quality. The results support hypothesis 1B but not hypothesis 1A,
meaning that the long-term perspective argument dominates the managerial opportunism
hypothesis in the relationship between earnings quality and CSD. Specifically, our findings
suggest that earnings quality is positively and significantly associated with CSD. We also
find that the relationship between earnings quality and CSD is weakened as the percentage of
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shares held by government increases, which confirms hypothesis 2. Meanwhile, the presence
of foreign investors does not influence the association between earnings quality and CSD,
which rejects hypothesis 3. Robustness tests also confirm these results.
In addition to the contribution from this study noted in the Introduction section, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the first concerted attempt to examine the relationship between
earnings quality and CSD for the small and newly emerging market of Vietnam. Vietnam is
one of the lowest ranked countries in protecting investors among the Southeast Asian
countries. In addition, the empirical results which demonstrate the current CSD practices of
Vietnamese listed firms and stakeholders’ perceptions to CSD, will benefit regulators in
better understanding firms’ CSD practices and stakeholders’ expectations. The evidences can
be references for Vietnamese authority to improve the current guidelines on the stakeholderrelevant CSD of Vietnamese listed firms. Furthermore, despite becoming a fast-growing
economy with increasing prominence in the Asia-Pacific, the Vietnamese economy is still
relatively under-examined, particularly with regard to its accounting and finance aspects (Vu,
Tower, and Scully 2011b). This study reflects an attempt to fill the gap in the literature by
extending the understanding of firms earnings quality, stakeholder-relevant CSD, and the
moderating effect of ownership structure in the Vietnamese context.
We acknowledge that the sample size and confining the analysis of disclosure to 2010
year may limit the generalizability of results. We chose the survey and annual reports
analysis to obtain clarity about the role Circular No. 09/2010/TT-BTC dated January 15,
2010 play in the transparency of disclosure of listed firms and stakeholders’ perspectives. The
requirement of five years’ rolling data to measure accruals quality while the two Vietnamese
stock exchanges with HOSE established in 2010 and HNX established in 2005, also
influenced the year of choice in the study. Studies document that firms’ disclosure policies
appear to remain relatively constant over time (Muttakin and Khan 2013, Healy, Palepu, and

Page 24 of 34

Sweeney 1995). A longitudinal study where disclosure policies have varied within the time
period can provide different insights. This study found the Audit firm selection (Big four
versus otherwise) and female board representation are likely to increase stakeholder-relevant
CSD, can bring forth a future study to examine the influence of other internal and external
corporate governance measures on corporate social disclosure.
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Table 1. List of 45 items with the mean importance weighted by four stakeholder-specific
groups for disclosure items and types, in their order of relative importance of items.
Panel A
List of 15 labor items and the mean importance weighted by employees for disclosure items
and disclosure types.
Labor items
(LA)
LA11
LA7
LA8
LA4
LA5
LA9
LA3
LA2
LA12
LA10
LA1
LA14
LA15
LA6
LA13

Total number of
Mean weight of each type of disclosure
Mean weight
of items
Both monetary firms disclosing
Narrative
Monetary
Numerical
item
disclosed
and numerical
7.47
6.53
6.75
6.92
7.51
86
7.38
6.28
6.00
7.17
7.06
14
7.29
6.49
6.31
7.02
6.97
52
7.28
6.22
5.99
7.19
6.92
26
7.28
6.34
5.99
7.09
6.84
4
7.27
6.54
6.37
7.06
6.88
28
7.18
6.15
7.00
7.19
7.68
7
7.15
6.03
5.85
6.92
6.69
38
7.11
6.65
6.10
7.10
7.12
57
7.05
6.20
6.02
6.94
6.90
89
6.97
5.77
5.85
7.04
7.27
124
6.78
5.84
6.35
6.74
7.16
54
6.7
5.73
5.69
6.88
6.90
8
6.47
5.94
5.60
6.69
6.34
15
6.44
5.97
5.27
6.53
6.26
133

Panel B
List of 11 human rights items and the mean importance weighted by lawyers and regulators for
disclosure items and disclosure types.
Mean weight of each type of disclosure
Total number of
Mean weight
Human rights
of items
Both monetary firms disclosing
items (HR)
Narrative
Monetary
Numerical
item
disclosed
and numerical
HR7
8.19
5.27
5.90
7.90
6.64
2
HR11
7.98
5.19
6.00
7.52
7.36
4
HR4
7.9
5.28
5.25
7.64
6.78
9
HR6
7.89
5.43
6.07
7.89
7.21
1
HR5
7.28
4.91
5.23
6.99
6.32
5
HK9
7.19
5.26
5.62
6.79
6.61
3
HR3
7.18
4.62
5.64
7.03
6.82
10
HR8
6.93
5.53
5.83
6.96
6.53
1
HR10
6.71
4.87
5.17
6.45
6.41
5
HR1
6.69
4.71
6.01
7.05
7.68
6
HR2
6.38
4.55
5.30
6.75
6.97
1
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Panel C
List of 10 items of societal aspects and the mean importance weighted by local communities for
disclosure items and disclosure types.
Mean weight of each type of disclosure
Total number of
firms disclosing
Both
item
Mean weight
monetary
Narrative Monetary
Numerical
Societal items of items
and
(SO)
disclosed
numerical
SO2
7.92
4.91
6.35
6.50
7.58
1
SO8
7.81
5.49
6.98
6.99
7.90
11
SO1
7.67
4.61
6.53
6.04
7.97
60
SO10
7.52
5.06
5.87
6.22
7.43
25
SO4
7.41
5.11
6.10
6.55
7.55
3
SO7
7.35
5.45
6.12
6.36
7.38
23
SO9
7.26
4.79
5.58
6.09
7.32
7
SO3
7.24
5.06
5.74
6.57
7.34
0
SO6
6.94
4.88
6.21
6.09
7.33
1
SO5
6.22
4.88
5.46
5.73
6.44
0
Panel D
List of 9 product items and the mean importance weighted by customers for disclosure items and
disclosure types
Number of
Mean weight of each type of disclosure
Product items Mean weight
firms disclosing
Both monetary
of items
(PR)
Narrative Monetary Numerical
item
and numerical
disclosed
PR1
8.08
5.22
6.14
6.58
7.68
83
PR5
8.07
6.30
6.17
7.08
7.76
42
PR9
7.8
5.61
6.56
6.70
8.09
7
PR8
7.77
5.97
6.02
6.64
7.11
0
PR3
7.71
5.88
5.43
6.09
6.74
133
PR7
7.64
5.56
5.62
6.49
7.35
16
PR6
6.98
6.05
5.68
5.60
5.89
133
PR2
6.94
5.57
5.63
6.21
6.53
6
PR2
6.62
5.59
5.28
5.57
6.13
0
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variables

Mean

SD

Min

Max

CSD_INDEX

0.10

0.05

0.03

0.23

Four sub-categories of CSD – Additional analysis
LAD_INDEX
SOD_INDEX
PRD_INDEX

0.17
0.04
0.16

0.08
0.05
0.05

0.03
0
0.1

0.41
0.23
0.3

HRD_INDEX

0.01

0.04

0

0.25

67.00

24.74

1.00

112.00

Dependent variable

Independent variable
EQ
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Four earnings attributes to construct the standardized aggregate earnings quality score
AQ

0.06

0.06

0.00

0.40

PERSIS

-0.44

0.86

-2.80

4.78

PREDICT

0.07

0.07

0.01

0.40

SMOOTH

0.48

0.45

0.03

2.65

0.27

0.21

0.00

0.79

Control variables
STATE
FOREIGN

0.12

0.14

0.00

0.49

AUDIT

0.16

0.37

0

1

ROA

0.08

0.08

-0.17

0.39

STOCK_EX

0.68

0.47

0

1

FEMALE
0.14
0.15
0.00
0.60
This table shows summary statistics for variables used in this paper. The final sample consists of 133 firms listed
on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges for the 2010 sample.
CSD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional CSD index;
LAD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional labor aspect disclosure index;
SOD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional society aspect disclosure index;
PRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional product responsibility aspect disclosure index;
HRD_INDEX = the stakeholder-driven, three-dimensional human rights aspect disclosure index;
EQ = the standardized aggregate earnings quality score, calculated as the average rank across the four individual
measures (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness);
AQ, PESIS, PREDICT, SMOOTH = the values of accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability,
and earnings smoothness, respectively;
STATE = the percentage of shareholding owned by the state;
FOREIGN = the percentage of shareholding owned by foreign investors;
AUDIT = 1 if firm’s auditor is a Big 4 and 0 if otherwise;
ROA = net profit over the total assets;
STOCK_EX = 1 if the firm is listed on HOSE and 0 for firms listed on HNX;
FEMALE = the percentage of female members in the board of directors.

Table 3.
The relationship between earnings quality and stakeholder-relevant CSD and the
moderating effect of the ownership structure on this relationship.
CSD_INDEX (1)
Coeff.
p-value
EQ
EQ x STATE
EQ x FOREIGN
STATE
FOREIGN
AUDIT
ROA
STOCK_EX
FEMALE
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
F statistic
p-value

0.0003*

-0.0056
-0.0284
0.0334***
0.1105**
0.0306***
0.0643***
0.0429
0.2507
0.2088
5.98***
0.000

0.079

0.763
0.357
0.002
0.046
0.000
0.010
0.007

CSD_INDEX (2)
Coeff.
p-value
0.0008***
-0.0015**
-0.0012
0.0925*
0.0379
0.0343***
0.1055*
0.0326***
0.0633***
0.0080

0.007
0.034
0.295
0.063
0.604
0.001
0.054
0.000
0.010
0.727
0.2796
0.2268
5.3***
0.000
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Mean VIF

1.31

5.15

The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a continuous
listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for the 2010 sample. The p-values are calculated using
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.

Table 4.
Stakeholder-relevant CSD and earnings quality: Excluding the accruals quality
measure in the standardized aggregate earnings quality score.
CSD_INDEX (1)
EQ_3ATTRI
EQ_3ATTRI x STATE
EQ_3ATTRI x FOREIGN
STATE
FOREIGN
AUDIT
ROA
STOCK_EX
FEMALE
Constant
R2
Adjusted R2
F statistic
p-value
Mean VIF

Coeff.
0.0003**

p-value
0.037

-0.0058
-0.0263
0.0326***
0.1095**
0.0302***
0.0630***
0.0422***

0.754
0.390
0.002
0.043
0.000
0.010
0.004

CSD_INDEX (2)
Coeff.
0.0007***
-0.0012*
-0.0008
0.0717
0.0196
0.0338***
0.1042*
0.0317***
0.0627**
0.0161

p-value
0.009
0.077
0.419
0.130
0.770
0.001
0.053
0.000
0.011
0.434
0.2789
0.2261
5.29***
0.000
4.59

0.2583
0.2168
6.22***
0.000
1.28

EQ_3ATTRI is the firm-specific standardized aggregate earnings quality score proxy, the average rank across
three measures (PERSIS, PREDICT, and SMOOTH). The sample consists of 133 firms listed on Ho Chi Minh
and Hanoi stock exchanges, each with a continuous listing history over the entire period from 2005 to 2011 for
the 2010 sample. The p-values are calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 5.
Earnings quality and labor and society aspects of stakeholder-relevant disclosure
quality
LAD&SOD_INDEX (1)
EQ
EQ x STATE
EQ x FOREIGN
STATE
FOREIGN
AUDIT
ROA
STOCKEXCHANGE
FEMALE
Constant
R2

Coeff.
0.0004*

p-value
0.061

0.0010
-0.0132
0.0334**
0.1525**
0.0347***
0.0909***
0.0402*

0.969
0.754
0.020
0.044
0.003
0.008
0.065
0.2138

LAD&SOD_INDEX (2)
Coeff.
0.0012***
-0.0019**
-0.0021
0.1276*
0.1094
0.0341**
0.1450*
0.0381***
0.0909***
-0.0104

p-value
0.005
0.045
0.165
0.061
0.276
0.018
0.053
0.001
0.007
0.741
0.2445
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Adjusted R2
F statistic
p-value
Mean VIF

0.1698
4.86***
0.0001
1.31

0.1892
4.42***
0.000
5.15

LAD&SOD_INDEX represents society and labor aspects of the disclosure index (the dependent variable).

Table 6.
First-stage regression summary statistics
Panel A: Earnings quality and CSD
Variable
R2
Adjusted R2
Partial R2
EQ
0.308
0.263
0.148
Critical Values
# of endogenous regressors: 1
Ho: Instruments are weak # of excluded instruments: 2
10%
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test
8.68

F
10.74

15%
5.33

Prob > F
0.0001

20%
4.42

25%
3.92

Panel B: The moderating effect of ownership structure on the relationship between earnings
quality and CSD
Variable
R2
Adjusted R2
Partial R2
0.797
0.781
0.092
EQ
Critical Values
# of endogenous regressors: 1
Ho: Instruments are weak # of excluded instruments: 2
10%
8.68
LIML Size of nominal 5% Wald test

F
6.17

15%
5.33

Prob > F
0.0028

20%
4.42

25%
3.92

Table 7.
Earnings quality and stakeholder-relevant CSD using limited-information maximum
likelihood (LIML) regression method
EQ

STATE

FOREIGN

AUDIT

ROA

STOCKEXCHANGE FEMALE

Constant

Coeff.

0.0008 -0.0125

-0.0381

0.0356

0.1665 0.0350

0.0719

0.0049

p-value

0.066

0.231

0.001

0.019 0.000

0.004

0.886

0.521

Significance *
***
**
***
R2 = 0.196, Wald statistic = 41.71, p-value = 0.000, N = 133.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance levels at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

***
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